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Bourneville is not known to many people even though he
had attempted to demonstrate that hypnotic trance represents an interpretation
model for many psychosocial manifestations, such as mediumistic states,
the behaviour of crowds or even mystic ecstasies. Placed halfway as
regards popularity, is Pierre Janet, remembered almost exclusively for
his book "From Anguish to Ecstasy", which is still today a basic reference
text for all those who have an interest in religious psychology; however
this author certainly deserves today an overall revaluation, since he
was the only one who passionately and enthusiastically continued to
investigate consciousness and trance, leaving behind a significant bulk
of writings and ideas which are now becoming topical again. For instance,
it is to this aristocratic and reserved thinker that we owe the term
"dissociation", an expression which is misused, but has deeply entered
the psychiatric language. Janet used the word "désagregation" to indicate
that mental phenomenon, both common and perfectly physiological, which
enables us to do two things at the same time: while we are driving a
car we can at the same time be engaged in conversation with a passenger;
while we are speaking on the telephone we can at the same time doodle
on a piece of paper; we can walk along the street while reading a book
and our "automatic pilot" enables us to reach our destination without
having to devote our whole attention to the task.
Janet believed this capacity of our mind to be the basic foundation
of trance and now, after over a century, many experts share this opinion.
On the other hand, the term "dèsagregation", corresponding to the English
word "dissociation", has become a synonym for serious pathology, giving
rise to continuous misunderstandings and communication problems. Janet
also devised the concept of "mental automatism" and of "narrowing the
field of consciousness", which have also been accepted in psychiatrics
even though, again, they have been misused. The point is that Janet
was a "physiologist" of consciousness rather than a psychopathologist,
and therefore, in view of the interests of culture in his days, he was
almost doomed to be forgotten. Furthermore, in the latter part of his
life, he developed a greater interest for the philosophic aspects of
consciousness, thus giving up the physiological and clinical side and
entering a frontier territory which was only of marginal interest to
clinicians and psychologists.
In fact, after the triumph of the psychoanalytical theory, with the
importance it attached to dreams, the attention of neurophysiology and
psychology focussed on the physiology of sleep and dreaming and, on
these themes, extremely important work was started which was to lead
to milestone discoveries, but was also to definitely diverge from the
idea that consciousness and its altered states are, even if only functionally,
related to certain disorders, or that hypnosis can be of use in psychotherapy.
The pivotal concept on which many neuroscientists have based (and continue
to base) their work is that consciousness is produced by the activity
of neurons and studies on sleep and dreaming seem to have demonstrated
this very fact: when asleep or dreaming, the brain functions in a different
way than when it is awake. Broadly speaking, this was the situation
in the 1950's, at the beginning of the so-called "psychedelic era",
when the high propagation of psychoactive substances started a pressing
interest for chemically induced modified states of consciousness. A
number of neurobiologists became enthusiastic about the idea of having
at their disposal "chemical scalpels" with which they could demonstrate
that consciousness has also a strong neurochemical basis.
In fact, it was (and it is) extremely surprising that a few hundred
millionths of a gram, a nearly homeopathic dose of LSD, is able to completely
disrupt the operating program of normal consciousness; and this discovery
not only strengthened the idea that consciousness is a "secretion" of
the neurons, but it seemed also to indicate that it is possible to study
the neurobiology of consciousness and that neurochemistry could be the
most direct way to the understanding of the pathogenesis of many psychiatric
disorders. The international prohibition, requested by the United States
government and undersigned by all the western governments, against the
production and experimentation of the so-called psycho-dyslectic drugs,
interrupted this kind of research and obliged neurobiologists to study
consciousness by taking different paths and exploring other approaches.
Meanwhile, we have witnessed a great change in scientific research,
which is no longer carried out by small groups of researchers confined
to small geographical areas, as it happened in the times of Charcot
and Freud, but is widely practised in countless laboratories scattered
all over the world. The result is that we now have much essential but
incomplete information about consciousness; all these pieces of information
remain confined within the field of research in which they were discovered,
waiting to be put together and connected in a mosaic capable of giving
them the coherence of a global image, that which in Anglo-Saxon scientific
language is called a "model".
In neuropsychology, for example, the studies on the different functional
roles of the two cerebral hemispheres have been absolutely fundamental,
and they seem to indicate that wakeful consciousness actually consists
of two coexistent and collaborating consciousnesses, even though one
of them, the consciousness of the left hemisphere, has a leading role.
This discovery should encourage neurophysiologists to find the real
basis of the phenomenon of hemispheric dominance but so far the subject
does not seem to have aroused the interest it deserves. This issue becomes
far more urgent when considering the fortuitous observation, made on
subjects whose two hemispheres have been surgically separated (that
is they have undergone commisurotomy).
These
patients claim that, after undergoing the operation, they no longer
have dreams: electroencephalographic tests demonstrate that in the right
hemisphere the regular alternation of the REM phases takes place, whereas
such phases have disappeared in the left one. On the other hand, oneirologists
(and therefore experimental psychology) have demonstrated that dream
activity is not confined to the REM phase, but is fully present in every
phase of sleep. In this manner they have given the psychoanalytic theory
a shake-up and have, at the same time, strengthened the concept that
the brain is basically a data processor (a computer) and that every
state of consciousness is characterised by a specific operating program.
Various other observations seemed to strengthen the concept that the
three basic states of consciousness, wakefulness, sleep and dreaming,
are mutually exclusive, in that one can either be awake or asleep or
dreaming, while other discoveries have demonstrated that it is possible
to retain a consciousness of wakefulness (self-consciousness) even while
dreaming: one can dream knowing that it is a dream, a phenomenon known
for a long time in parapsychology with the name of "lucid dream", but
considered impossible by academic psychology. From a clinical point
of view, the most significant progress has resulted from experimental
research into hypnosis, which has been abundantly revalued.
Hypnosis has proved to be a very useful condition of consciousness for
understanding many of its modified states. Trance was no longer to be
used as a concept for understanding ailing consciousness, but rather
for understanding physiological consciousness, as Janet had rightly
perceived. During the state of trance there would seem to be a suspension
of the dominance mechanism and contemporaneous operation of right and
left hemisphere consciousnesses, that of wakefulness and that of dreaming,
an absolutely physiological and natural functional condition, which
can only be described with the term suggested by Janet, "dissociation",
as opposed to its contrary, "association". The latter, on the other
hand, could be proposed to describe the cooperation which characterises
ordinary consciousness when the dominance mechanism is fully active.
Based on this theory of the structure of trance, and based on the discovery
that in a divided brain the left hemisphere can no longer dream, there
has been the suggestion that the right hemisphere might be the seat
of the Freudian unconscious.
This
suggestion, on the one hand, at last provides the unconscious with an
exact neuronal seat, but on the other hand considerably reappraises
the very concept of the unconscious: it is no longer seen as an unreachable
dimension, which is remote and uncontrollable, but rather as being easily
accessible by inducing a state of trance, and influenceable by means
of the rationality of the left hemisphere. In short we could carry on
with a list of small discoveries or important observations which are
gradually leading us towards a model of consciousness, but are, at this
stage, still scattered and complete in themselves. Nevertheless a number
of attempts have been made in order to link these scattered data together;
these have resulted in at least two models which have influenced for
a few years the activity of the experts.
The
first model is the one suggested by Roland Fischer who called it "map
of the states of consciousness" because it should be of use both to
internal navigators and to researchers to find their way in the labyrinths
of consciousness. According to Fischer, having accepted the brain/computer
metaphor, the state of consciousness of relaxed wakefulness corresponds
to an operating state where there is a substantial balance between amount/speed
of data input in the central processing unit and the related processing
speed. In the metaphor, the processing unit is the cerebral cortex,
the input from senses (sight, hearing, touch etc.) corresponds to the
keyboard and the soma represents the peripheral units on which the processing
results appear (changes in the internal chemical state, changes in the
neurovegetative parameters, actions etc.). The state of consciousness
of relaxed wakefulness is considered the landmark and from this, by
increasing or reducing the amount of sensorial data entered in the computer,
or by increasing the processing speed, it is possible to obtain/induce
some changes in the state of consciousness, which are somehow proportionate
to the increase or reduction in the processor's workload.
So,
when we get up in the morning, we proceed from relaxed wakefulness to
a "daily routine" state of consciousness, which is characterised by
a moderate increase in sensorial input and mental hustle and bustle
(checking the coffeepot, seeing to personal hygiene, thinking of the
first things to be done at work, etc.), which however is not too far
from the input/processing equilibrium found in relaxed wakefulness.
When we arrive at work, the amount of data received by the processor,
as well as the related processing speed, undergo a marked increase and
we enter a state of consciousness called "of sensitivity".
Later on, during the day, when our job demands maximum commitment, we
enter a state of consciousness defined "of creativity", characterised
by the speed required to process the data, that is by the impossibility
of evaluating and processing them slowly. In these conditions, the processor/cortex
operates at full capacity, which means that any further increase in
the amount of data and in the processing speed would result in our entering
a state of consciousness defined "anxiety". This progression, which
is universally experienced, is also characterised by specific, subjective
experiences, such as directing attention towards the outer environment
and the need to control reality in an increasingly meticulous manner,
which, in terms of dynamic psychology, means a progressive increase
in the Ego functions and a decrease in the presence of the Self. In
practice, even though the model offers a description of the physiology
of consciousness, it describes at the same time the pathogenesis of
anxiety. A number of clinicians, mainly from the Cognitivist school,
would recognise in this model the foundation of their viewpoint: it
is not the unconscious that causes illness, but thought. Nevertheless,
this progression is reversible: it is sufficient to decrease the working
speed of the processing unit or reduce the input from the senses (that
is calm down and return to relaxed wakefulness).
If,
on the other hand, the sensorial overload persists or increases, or
the external reality demands a further increase in the data processing
speed, one enters a state described by Fischer as "acute schizophrenic"
or also as "hyperphrenic", in an attempt, by resorting to these inappropriate
terms, to describe the operating chaos produced by the excessive functional
demand on the brain/computer. But, while the causes of anxiety can be
traced back to an exaggerated central activation, the comparison between
the state of dissociation resulting from anxiety and the mental state
of the main psychiatric pathology has given rise to an insurmountable
misunderstanding.
This
brings to the surface the serious ambiguity inherent in the use by Janet
of the word "désagregation", which in the Anglo-Saxon medical culture
has become a synonym for pathologic dissociation: if, rather than denominating
this condition "acute schizophrenic state", Fischer had called it "state
of dissociation", in line with Janet's interpretation of the term, the
model would have retained its complete reliability, by simply describing
the dissociation of trance and remaining within the boundaries of physiology.
But, evidently, Fischer was not familiar with hypnosis and this inaccuracy
seemed to many experts a mistake serious enough to completely invalidate
the model. This model, beyond the dissociative state, provides for further
changes in the state of consciousness.
According to Fischer, the reaching of the processor/cortex' operating
limits causes the blockage of the computer/brain and originates a state
of consciousness similar to catatonia (once again a term derived from
pathology is used, thus generating further confusion, while, according
to Fischer, the involuntary movements which can be induced in hypnotic
trance perfectly correspond to the state in which the brain has fallen).
Entry
in the catatonic state is associated with the loss of sensorial contacts
with external reality: the brain segregates itself, becomes deaf, dumb,
insensitive to touch and loses taste and smell. This is the condition
of ecstasy, a state in which the speed of the processor goes back to
normal, the operating program is that of wakefulness, but the data being
processed are completely hallucinatory because they no longer come from
the outside but originate directly from the inside of the central nervous
system itself. Fischer built this model in an experimental manner, by
studying the psychophysiological and neuropsychological effects of psychoactive
substances, as well as data derived from experimental literature and
ethnologic and anthropologic traditions (particularly with respect to
ecstasy). Consequently, even if he made mistakes in terminology or was
wrong in the conceptual interpretation of the phenomenology he observed,
the objective data still remain and are repeatable as are all respectable
experimental results. The concept of activation of the central processor,
for instance, depicts an increase of the ergotrophic activity which,
in turn, becomes a progressive activation of the orthosympathetic system.
This hyperactivation is objectively recognizable in the corporeal periphery
in terms of heart rate, muscle tone, arterial pressure, glycemia, perspiration
etc.
The states described so far constitute an unavoidable progression, a
continuum. Consequently one cannot pass into the next state without
first experiencing the previous one. This sequence of states of central
stimulation has been called "continuum of progressive ergotrophic activation"
and gives a neurobiological explanation of a number of practices developed
for millenniums by the various peoples in the world in order to modify
their state of consciousness. Besides using psychotropic stimulant substances
(for instance psilocybin), journeys towards excitement and ecstasy are
provoked by tribal dances, overloading the brain/computer with intense
auditory and cenesthetic stimulations, by the dervish dances in a circle,
which overload the labyrinths, by the practices of the Bacchantes with
wine, drums and disorderly dances, etc.
As a matter of fact, according to Fischer, Catholic mystic ecstasy is
a state reached by means of stimulating techniques (probably through
intense emotional activation) and should be considered as the final
stage of the ergotrophic continuum. As opposed to this sequence of states
of excitement, there is a continuum constituted by a series of states
of consciousness caused by a progressive decrease in the sensorial input
and in the processing speed of the elaborator/cortex. This is the "continuum
of trophotropic activation", that is of progressive orthosympathetic
activation. The states constituting it are those of deep relaxation,
of meditation, of pre-sleep, of higher meditation and, finally, of "samadhi",
that is Yoga ecstasy.
The
steps of this progression have also been built experimentally by means
of psychoactive substances (precisely lorazepam) but, fortunately, in
describing the conditions of consciousness in each step, Fischer did
not make use of psychiatric terminology, although it is easy to understand
that the step of this progression corresponding to anxiety in the other
continuum is depression. Also the sequence of states which can be reached
by the progressive extinction of the sensorial contacts with the environment
or the voluntary or involuntary decrease of the processing speed of
the computer/cortex gives a neurobiological explanation for various
other practices developed by mankind throughout the centuries to modify
states of consciousness in order to reach ecstasy: these are the Yoga
techniques and those of eastern cultures in general.
Surprisingly, missing from the list of the states of progressive sedation,
is the condition of hypnotic trance which, in our culture, is considered
a state of relaxation and is exploited, partially, exactly for this
reason. In fact also (or above all) the practices of intense concentration
or of progressive self-sedation easily lead to Janet's type of dissociation,
as it is convincingly demonstrated by studies on sleep, that is on the
hypnagogic state: every evening, when we are about to fall asleep, without
realising, we all repeat the same actions performed by meditators or
by a hypnotist while inducing a state of trance. We deviate our attention
from the outside reality to the mental (impoverishing or abolishing
the input from the senses) and we concentrate it on imagination or thoughts
with such intensity as to completely lose contact with reality.
The hypnagogic state (which is one of the possible modified states of
consciousness) only lasts a few minutes and, although we all find it
very pleasant, it is not incisively recorded in the list of our interior
experiences. In fact, if we artificially prolong it, a rather odd phenomenology
takes place, in that we easily experience hallucinations and we are
under the impression that our mind has somehow split into two. That
is the time when the right hemisphere gives way to its twin and, although
we are still unable to explain why hallucinations should take place,
this phenomenology, in a fascinating way, recalls hypnotic trance and,
once again, Janet's dissociation condition. In conclusion, it appears
clear that the psychophysiologic operations we carry out in order to
fall asleep, which are similar to those a hypnotist prompts us to do
when inducing hypnotic trance, and also similar to those performed by
a meditator, produce functional dissociation between the two cerebral
hemispheres which can lead to sleep, prolongation of trance or ecstasy.
The Fischer model is structured on neurophysiological, psychophysiological
and psychopharmacological data and it therefore is a neurobiological
model, very useful for studying the behaviour of the consciousness hardware,
but not as enlightening as to the events taking place from a neuropsychological
and psychological point of view.
An
attempt to fill this theoretical void was the second model of consciousness
and of the states of consciousness referred to above. This is Charles
Tart's "systemic model", according to which consciousness should be
viewed as a system of functions, each of which contributes to the configuration
of structural sets which are its various modified states. In other words,
each state resembles a cocktail in which the various "higher nervous
functions" are represented in variable proportions: when this mixture
steadily persists for psychologically relevant periods of time (and
therefore long enough for a recognisable subjective experience to take
place), we may call this a "distinct state of consciousness".
Some of the most important basic components of these mixtures (which
once used to be called "higher nervous functions") are: esteroception,
enteroception, processing of incoming sensorial data (input), memory,
the subconscious (by which Tart actually means the Freudian unconscious),
emotions, the faculty to make assessments and decisions, the sense of
time, the sense of identity and motor output, and so on. In dream, for
instance, esteroception is almost entirely abolished and the sensorial
input processing function also goes down to very low levels, whereas
memory becomes a very important ingredient in terms of quantity.
The
decision powers are blocked, and the sense of time is distorted. In
conclusion, according to Tart, with the employment of quantitative scales
to "measure" the importance of each ingredient, it is possible to represent
each state of consciousness on a system of Cartesian coordinates, and
no longer compile a single map but a whole atlas of the states of consciousness.
In those days (thirty years ago) this concept had a number of followers,
even though its practical applications have been very limited and very
few researchers have attempted to experimentally produce the various
maps of the atlas.
It
has been useful for the description of the phenomenology of consciousness
and to focalise certain nodal points of such phenomenology; however
it may now be regarded as superseded. Many researchers have found it
more productive to investigate the mental activity characterising the
various states of consciousness as a computer operating system, that
is by employing the information theory; this may possibly have involved
the loss of the systemic perspective but on the other hand has enabled
them to pursue paths which have led to the modification of various dogmas
so far unassailable. For instance, the demonstration that the brain
continues to process data during all the stages of sleep has reopened
the whole question of the function of sleep, stressing that it is also
important to establish "why" it should continue to process data, as
well as "how" it does it.
Others,
in an attempt to understand the machine language which acts as interface
between hardware and software, have started an in-depth investigation
of memory and have reached the point of stating that consciousness is
the result of learning, thus reinvigorating a debate involving both
neuroscience and philosophy as to how much of our mind's structure is
learnt and how much is innate. In conclusion, as mentioned earlier,
today scientific research proceeds so fast and diffusely, that specialists
find it quite difficult to keep their colleagues' activity under control
and often are not concerned with the implications that a certain observation
may have in other fields of knowledge. As regards Tart's systemic model,
even though the system concept has not proved very productive, full
validity must be acknowledged with respect to the parts of the model
which analyse and attempt to explain how the changes in states of consciousness
take place.
According
to Tart, each state of consciousness/system is stabilised by a "functional
adhesive" which prevents any change in the relationship among its components.
This adhesive is attention/awareness and it is through manipulation
or self-manipulation of this function that changes in state of consciousness
are produced. Generally, attention can be: 1) entirely projected into
the outside environment; 2) entirely concentrated on the inside environment;
3) fluctuating between inside and outside. In the state of wakefulness,
attention is continuously directed on the environment, but if we start
to interiorise it and concentrate it on mental contents, we set off
for the radical change called sleep. As mentioned above, self-control
of attention is also the foundation of meditation practices which, as
eastern cultures claim, represent the main path to getting to know the
structure of our mind/consciousness and how it works.
As mentioned, a hypnotist also induces trance by controlling the attention
of the subject he wishes to hypnotise: he deliberately and progressively
diverts the subject's attention towards the inside environment and gets
it to focus on sensations and somatic or mental perceptions until the
outside environment is no longer perceived. In this way, the hypnotist
applies "dissociating forces" to the original structure of the system/consciousness,
and once he has dissociated it, that is he has produced a new system/consciousness
(the state of trance), he applies "stabilising" forces which make the
new system long-lasting.
The
meditator carries out the same process on his own, without having to
resort to anybody else's help. And we all follow the same process to
go to sleep, with the only difference that, contrary to what happens
with hypnosis or meditation, at a certain point we lose control over
the situation, having triggered a series of automatic mechanisms which
make us fall asleep. Meditators may also lose control over the situation
and enter an ecstatic state, but, at this stage, we do not yet know
why. Fischer's and Tart's state of consciousness models where, in many
respects, complementary. Time has demonstrated their incompleteness
and, in some respects, also their superficiality. However, we should
not forget that these are physiological models, which proves there has
been a significant change in the manner consciousness and its states
are viewed, compared to the Salpetrière clinicians: before we look for
physiopathological explanations, it is wise to investigate normal consciousness
in depth, and today we are prepared to do so. In neurophysiology, psychiatry,
psychology and neuropsychology manuals it has become proper to include
or add a chapter covering states of consciousness, but each of these
subjects can only describe these phenomenologies in part: sleep and
dream, the modifications of consciousness induced by psychoactive substances,
the bipolarity of the conscious and the unconscious, the functional
attributes of the cerebral hemispheres, and so on.
A
culture laboriously distilled and carefully sieved through experimental
liturgy, which proceeds slowly. There will probably be great progress
when we start to harmonise western scientific knowledge and eastern
psychological understanding.
According to the eastern cultures which, by tradition, have always devoted
much more energy than the western culture to self-study, there is only
one model of the structure of consciousness: the one which says that
reality is an illusion and a product of the mind. Countless writings
attempt to explain this strong statement and, to this end, meticulously
analyse the structure of thought and how the mind works. Even though
this knowledge was codified centuries ago, here in the west it has so
far remained unused, since it is expressed in a metaphoric language
or as an unreliable account of subjective experiences. So far, we have
only had minor appropriations or loans: Carl Gustav Jung became very
fond of "The Tibetan Book of the Dead" which relates NDE's (Near Death
Experiences), that is a phenomenology which western science has only
acknowledged a few decades ago and which, in any case, it considers
illusory.
Dream
Yoga, a technique which teaches how to "lucid dream", is about two thousand
years old, whereas the possibility of dreaming with the awareness of
dreaming has only recently been accepted, thanks to Stephen La Berge's
stubbornness. Regarding the possibility of lucid dreaming, Tibetans
have constructed a model of consciousness and a theory of dream which
are a masterpiece of simplicity, even though still unacceptable for
our experimental science. However, this is a path to take in the future
and we now await a brave genius who, in the same way as Sigmund Freud,
may be able to construct a theory of consciousness capable of satisfying
both the eastern and the western cultures.
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