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The election of Kostunica
to the presidency in Yugoslavia has opened the way towards a solution
to the Balkans crisis, but the road towards normalcy is still riddled
with obstacles.
For
years now, there has been the general consensus that the responsibility
for the Balkans wars has been completely in the hands of Slobodan Milosevic,
and that his removal from the scene represented a fundamental premise
for returning peace to the region. But now that the former strong man
of Belgrade has indeed become a non-entity, the chancelleries are realising
that many other obstacles lie ahead on the road to normalcy.
Milosevic's
successor, Kostunica, is doubtless a democrat, and seems anxious to
re-establish the international ties interrupted under his predecessor
and to revive what has become the most devastated economy in Europe.
But, he is also a Serb nationalist who has no intention of relinquishing
the Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo nor allow his turbulent neighbours
to tread on his toes. To complete the picture, the new president also
harbours strong resentment against the United States, whom he believes
responsible for the NATO bombings that brought his country to its knees.
He is therefore creating a never-before-experienced tension between
Washington and its European allies with regards to the best policy to
follow in the Balkans. With the fall of the last communist dictator
in Europe - surprisingly easy and painless as it was - all the games
have been reopened and a situation that had been frozen for years is
rapidly heating up, even before international diplomacy has had a chance
to prepare for it. Two months ago, the problem was maintaining the isolation
of Serbia, while now, the question has become how to painlessly and
effortlessly insert it into the Balkans context and to enable it to
carry out its natural role of "pivot". Two months ago, the problem was
imposing sanctions against Milosevic without reducing the country to
a state of chaos. Now, the dilemma has become how to reconstruct a country
semi-destroyed by war as quickly as possible, where many factories are
closed, almost half the viable population is unemployed, and the average
salary of those who do work has been reduced to a mere Lire 85,000 a
month.
Kostunica
has had to accept a shadowy compromise with the Armed Forces, with the
Security Services, and the government machine, which up until now had
been controlled by his adversary. It is likely that Kostunica promised
to offer guarantees that he would not deliver Milosevic nor his numerous
associates - all accused of war crimes - to the court of The Hague.
He might have even had to make deals with the drug and smuggling lords
and the heads of public industry who were close to the former dictator,
no less responsible for the sanctions of the economic collapse. Therefore,
one might ask whether or not it is appropriate to immediately open an
unlimited line of credit for Kostunica, ignoring the numerous shadows
present in his biography, or whether to proceed with the normalisation
of relations more gradually, influencing it to the nature of the decisions
that - almost every day - he is called upon to make. There are those
who expect Kostunica to work unconditionally in favour of stability,
because this is the principal objective that the USA and the European
Union - anxious to rid themselves as soon as possible of the uncomfortable
and expensive role of policemen of the Balkans - are pursuing at the
time.In order to definitively win over the trust of the West, Kostunica
must organise on four fronts. On the internal front, he must finish
the job of removing power from the men from the old regime, progressively
isolating Milosevic even within his own socialist party, but also hurry
to dismantle what is today (with the possible exception of Belorussia),
the last communist system surviving the fall of the Berlin Wall. This
is fundamental not only to start up - with international assistance
-the reconstruction of the country, but also to enable private investors
to invest in Serbia offering certain indispensable guarantees and thereby
freeing the energy of the country.
The
second front is represented by restoring the fundamental civil rights,
systematically crushed by Milosevic, though never "eliminated" altogether
like what took place in the former Soviet Union. This would mean reinforcing
the freedom of the press and freedom of speech, already revived the
day after the removal of the dictator, reestablishing that these rights
are secured even for minorities, and putting an end to the omnipotence
of the Security Services. Another difficulty will be to reduce the power
of the Mafia to reasonable levels - if not eliminate it entirely - which
prospered in the shadow of the old regime and took over entire sections
of the economy.
In
the third place, Kostunica must repair its relations with the neighbouring
countries, which deteriorated greatly during the Milosevic era and,
in some cases, still harbour unhealed wounds. There should be no problems
with Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Hungary that cannot be overcome,
as each seems prepared to pay the price for a normalisation of the relations
that would be only beneficial for everyone. Modest probabilities for
compromise exist with Croatia, where the end of the ultranationalist
regime led by Franjo Tudjman and the advent to the power of a moderate
leadership that looks to Europe have softened the anti-Serb sentiments.
But the reconciliation may not be so painless: Belgrade has asked that
the Serb population expelled from the Krajna during the final phases
of conflict return to their own homes. Zagreb has asked for compensation
for the brutal destruction carried out by the Serbs on its territory
when Milosevic attempted to take over Slavonia. And a mountain of reciprocal
guarantees will be necessary before acceptable relations can be resumed.
Kostunica has already taken some important steps towards peace with
Bosnia, Belgrade's arch rival during the Nineties, when he recognised
the validity of the orders agreed upon in Dayton Accord and formally
relinquished the demands for the annexation of one third of the country
inhabited by Serbs. Finally, the two big questions of Kosovo and Montenegro
still remain unanswered, and are riddled with contradictions even for
the West.
The
1244 Resolution by the Security Council, putting an end to the Kosovo
operations, had established that the contested region had the right
to an advanced form of independence, but would still remain under the
sovereignty of Yugoslavia, even though NATO had been preparing to set
up a sort of protectorate. It also stated that after a certain period
of time, Belgrade would have had the right to send its troops back in.
In the meantime, however, a good part of the Serb minority was led into
flight by the vindictive fury of the Albanians and these, since they
were in charge of the situation, were united in their quest to claim
a full and unconditional independence from Yugoslavia. Of the political
parties that participated in the administrative elections on 28 October,
not even one neglected to take on this mission in their political platforms.
But if, when Milosevic was in power, renewed talks between Belgrade
and Pristina was out of the question, it was relatively simple for the
West to postpone all decisions in this regard. However, now that democracy
has been returned to Yugoslavia, not even the United States - great
defenders of the Kosovar people - can continue to ignore the commitments
undertaken. If Kostunica must observe certain rules, then the Europeans
and Americans must do likewise.
The
Western countries' position on Montenegro is also rather embarrassing.
In order to make things difficult for Milosevic, the West made heavy
use of Djukanovic, the premier and leader of the independent party,
suspected of conspiracy with the international crime organisations.
Up until September, it was convenient to have Djukanovic holding the
reigns on Belgrade, but now he represents an obstacle to stability,
yet another potential crazed splinter in the Balkans puzzle.
The
conclusion: the "October revolution" in Belgrade does not represent
the end to the turbulence in the Balkans; indeed, it has only created
a more solid foundation. Before beginning to think about pulling troops
out of Bosnia and Kosovo, and closing the last chapter of this bloody
tale, many pieces of the mosaic must still be put into place.
(Traduzione
Interppres sas - Giussano)
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