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In the Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus
starts off with this epitaph-like observation. “There is only one serious
philosophical problem; that of suicide. To judge whether life is or
is not worth the trouble of living is to answer the fundamental question
of philosophy”.
To
answer this question one can adopt two strategies that reflect two different
approaches.
The
first places the source of the meaning of life simply in the choice
of the individual, in his or her will. In this approach, therefore,
it is the choice itself that decides on the value. In this first case,
philosophy is a useless exercise. At most, as we shall say, philosophy
can support this choice, but it cannot contribute to any theoretical
solution. The second approach, on the other hand, distinguishes between
the moment of knowing and that of choosing.
Here
it is held that it is possible to say in a reasoned manner whether life
has a meaning or not, and what that meaning is.
In
this second case, therefore, the choice will take place in the presence
of some knowledge. In both cases, however, it is evident that the choice,
even though it may have different reasons and contents, will depend
on the individual who wills, but in the second case this choice will
take place in the presence of a solution that does not depend on the
choice itself. Putting in differently, the choice of the individual
must measure itself against the “truth” that relates to the meaning
of life.
In
principle, if one comes to the point of saying that life “is meaningless”,
as Sartre’s existentialism, for example, liked to say, the necessary
consequence would not be suicide but a return to the first approach;
that is, one would rely on the decision of the individual to give meaning
to life. In fact we can observe that often both those who deny any “objective”
meaning in life and those who aim to found this meaning in terms of
truth, end by sharing some values and reduce their dispute to the plane
of ultimate motivations, but not of immediate choices. Now, our epoch
seems particularly fascinated by the idea of placing the source of the
meaning of existence in mankind, thus thinking it possible to eliminate
the obstacle of search for and reference to an “objective” verity. But
when you ask yourself about the “meaning” of life, you cannot remain
indifferent. No solution is neutral: the discussion is one that involves
us all, because determination of the meaning of human life means affirming
something that questions me and all those who share the human condition
with me.
Sartre
himself reminds us that when we choose we in fact delineate the idea
of man that must exist; that is, at bottom, in choosing for myself I
choose for all humanity.
For
this reason it is not possible to eliminate the question of the “truth”
of the solutions proposed. Even if one opted for a sort of radical subjectivism,
this subjectivism would implicitly advance the pretence of being “true”
and of being posited because there is no valid alternative. But our
epoch is not inclined to accept reference to a verity too easily because,
appearances notwithstanding, it is marked by a widespread “fideism”
or if you prefer, irrationalism. We find this attitude expressed both
in those who “decide” that life has meaning (and perhaps place this
meaning in the option for God) and in those who decide that it has no
meaning (and perhaps decide that God does not exist, without for that
reason ceasing to believe in man and his enterprises).
However
it is not difficult to note that the notion of truth recurs, without
arousing particular mistrust, in the positing of scientific discoveries,
and that one speaks easily of truth in ordinary language. We want to
know whether or not it is true that we are ill, whether or not it is
true that our bank account is in credit, whether or not it is true that
the airlines will be on strike. In other words, the notion of truth
is familiar to us, and Pilate’s question “What is truth?” seems applicable
only to some sorts of truth, those that concern the ultimate meaning
of existence. Some people argue that if one accepted the idea that there
is an objective and absolute truth, one would fall into intolerance
of those who do not recognise that truth. Others think that the claim
to establish that truth leads to limitation of human freedom. Now, to
this last claim one can reply that in reality truth is a condition for
liberty, since no one can choose or refuse what in some way he does
not know. Finding out how things truly are is necessary in order to
be able to decide freely. The limitations put by each individual on
his or her freedom in the face of recognition of the truth are still
free actions. As regards the widespread conviction that there is a close
relationship between intolerance and affirmation of the truth in itself
and for itself (or, if we prefer, absolute rather than relative truth),
there are some points that must be made. In the first place, one must
not confuse ‘logical’ intolerance with ‘practical’ intolerance. Logical
intolerance says only that every true thesis excludes the false one.
Practical intolerance, on the other hand, drives us to exclude or marginalise
those who are considered “in error”. But this attitude can equally be
practised by the relativist (who ends by not tolerating those who have
claimed to reach an objective knowledge) and by the non relativist.
Everyone believes he or she is right. But this certainty cannot become
evidence until one is in a position to demonstrate the error of others
and therefore to know (not only to believe) that one’s own conception
of life is the conception of life that is also valid for those who err
in their own evaluation. And since one cannot know a priori who is in
error, we must all commit ourselves to searching for the error because,
as Pascal put it, “we are all in the same boat” in this human affair.
Does the fact that I do not recognise my error pose problems of relationship
with others? Obviously it may do, but what is required, once again,
is to understand that truth cannot, by its nature, be imposed on the
knowledge of anyone. Assuming a priori that failure to recognise the
error does not derive from bad faith (in the dialectic for truth one
is interested in truth, not in one’s own thesis) then one must affirm
that some conclusions do not have sufficient evidence to make me exit
from my error. In the event that the dialectic for truth does not lead
to evidence regarding the meaning of life, one remains at the starting
point, that which imposes a decision, but this time the decision would
be the outcome of a research which, in the absence of evidence reminds
us that every one of us is potentially in error.
And
again, it is worth repeating, in the event of the outcome of the research
being positive, the meaning of existence would be put before the conscience
of each of us, but this evidence gained by argumentation would not generate
new practices, because the truth would question our liberty but would
not determine it. With that, we have limited ourselves to recalling
that objections to the search for truth based on practical considerations
are not valid. At the same time, however, it is clear that the question
of truth, in confrontation and dialogue, requires continuous resumption
of the reasons of truth itself. Forgetfulness of the argumentations
that are at the root of the reply to the question on the meaning of
life continuously exposes the reflection to dogmatism and allows erroneous
conceptions, too, to cohabit and coexist, determining a situation of
perennial theoretical fragility. In this absence of critical confrontation,
it is the most persuasive theses, those that obtain consent most easily,
that impose themselves. The question of the meaning of existence is
undoubtedly a serious question, that not only requires serious answers
but true answers.
Medicine
too is interested in these answers, especially since it has claimed
to advance its competence to human welfare, conceived of as strictly
correlated with health. But what welfare can be created where there
is confusion on the very meaning of being human?
(traduzione
Interpres sas-Giussano)
Adriano
Pessina
Docente
di Filosofia Morale
e
Bioetica Università Cattolica di Milano
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