Having got rid of the Taliban, America is now tempted to settle with Iraq, but the task does not look at all easy To attack or not to attack Iraq; that is the question. In the wake of the 11 September attacks, the United States have repeatedly indicated that, once the Taliban had been defeated, the next objective of the war against terrorism could be their old enemy Saddam Hussein, who is still in place ten years after his ruinous defeat in the Gulf War.

Bush referred to him as a possible objective even during his speech on the state of the Union. Not only does the Baghdad dictator continue to collect chemical, bacteriological and (possibly) nuclear weapons, in spite of the commitments made, not only has he been repelling at the border the UNO inspectors instructed to keep him under control, but there also is evidence of contacts between his secret service and Al Qaeda men during the preparation of the attack against the Twin Towers.
A book by the expert Laurie Mylroie irrefutably shows that Ramzi Yousef, the architect of the first attack on New York, ascribed to Bin Laden in 1993, was in fact a member of the Iraqi secrete service. Some people think that Baghdad agents may be ultimately responsible for diffusion of anthrax germs in America. The CIA has always regarded Saddam as the most dangerous dictator in existence; a master in the art of survival, who makes no bones about sentencing to death thousands of people, if this can prove of use for his interests.
Settling with him, who in 1993 tried to murder his farther, is certainly one of the objectives that George W. Bush is most keen on. His government’s hawks, such as the vice president Cheney and the vice minister of Defence Wolfowitz, are pushing him to hesitate no longer and at least work out a plan for the elimination of the dictator.
In November, it could almost be regarded as done.
The United States had launched a powerful campaign to emphasise both the support granted by the Iraqi regime to international terrorism and the continuous violations of human rights Baghdad was responsible for, as well as the ever-worsening relationship between Saddam and his people. Innumerable articles insisted on the fact that elimination of the Rais is now almost a duty of the international community towards the Iraqis, who have been oppressed for 30 years: they are hungry, exploited and obliged to engage in meaningless conflicts.
Major governmental personalities, ranging from the Advisor for Safety Condoleeza Rice to the undersecretary for International Affairs Bolton, have stated, without mincing their words, that Saddam continues to be at the top of the list of the wicked, and that Washington “is no longer willing to put up with his machinations”. But after a couple of weeks the propaganda machine has stopped: the president has realised that, compared to what a war against Iraq would be, the Afghan expedition has been a piece of cake, and that very few members of the great antiterrorism coalition which has been put together against Bin Laden would follow him in an attack on Baghdad.
Besides, at least so far, there would be no casus belli: unless it wants to come into open conflict with the United Nations, not even a world superpower can afford to mount a large-scale offensive based on circumstantial evidence, and the stubborn refusal to accept the inspections prescribed by the 1991 armistice may at best be used to tighten up economic sanctions. Whilst making up its mind as to what to do, Washington continues in any case to evaluate the political pros and cons of an attack, to wok out its probable costs and to sound out European and Arab alleys as to their reactions.
The results of these preliminary enquiries is so uncertain that so far Bush has not made a single positive move against Saddam, not even that of authorising the supply of weapons to the Iraqi National Congress, the federation of democrat parties in exile, which declares itself ready to play the role that the Northern Alliance has plaid in Afghanistan. In planning any attack, Washington must in any case take into account the amazing stability of the regime. Having renounced to march on Baghdad in 1991 and overthrow the dictator manu militari, for fear of finding themselves at a dead-end, the United States have attempted to undermine his power in every possible way.
They have forbidden Iraqi planes to access either Northern Iraq, where the Kurd minority lives, or the South, homeland of the Shiite community, thus creating in fact two semi-independent zones, where Saddam’s authority is limited by the impossibility of implementing a real repression. They have inflicted, through UNO, extremely strict economic sanctions, which in ten years have bled the country white. They have blocked exportations of Iraqi oil, with the only exception of the amounts required on one side to repay Kuwait and on the other to purchase the food and medicines required to alleviate the populations’ sufferings.
They have continued to fly over the country in search of “forbidden” military targets, systematically destroying the anti-aircraft emplacements that attempted a reaction. They have to put a spoke in the wheel of all countries, whether Arab or European, which for political, economical or even only humanitarian reasons attempted to slacken the reins. They have encouraged, although without much success, the Iraqi Opposition to fuel the people’s discontent and pave the way for an insurrection. It has all proved useless. Saddam has withstood both external pressures and a couple of attempted military coups, either by openly challenging the American enemy or by plotting against him secretly. In order to preserve his power, he relies on a small bunch of relatives and co-operators, the so-called Tikrit clan, he has formed a praetorian guard made up of approximately 100,000 true blues, and has established an extreme personality cult.
The state-controlled TV network and press daily sing his praises, and towns are full of huge pictures of his, which either represent him as the leader of the war against the infidels, or as a caring paterfamilias, or as the 8th century caliph who founded the Abasside dynasty. A relentless propaganda has succeeded in persuading many Iraqis that Saddam has come out the winner of America’s great challenge, that he is the only Arabian leader capable of standing up to the Imperialists’ domineering attitude and that the West is fully responsibility for the miserable conditions in which the country now is.
Whoever is suspected of infidelity is liquidated without mercy and the attempted attacks on the dictator (at least four, according to the English and American secrete service) have all failed.
This however has not prevented all sorts of mischief from happening in Baghdad over the last ten years, also in the Rais’ family circle.
At first, he tried to bring up as his successor his eldest son, Udai, a sadist who is charged with innumerable rapes and murders; at a certain point, when he killed a governmental officer during an official reception in Mrs Moubarak’s honour, Saddam was even forced to bring him to trial for murder, although he subsequently pardoned him and sent him into exile for a year.
But only when Udai, after many other atrocities, was the target of an attempt on his life in 1996, which reduced his physical and mental abilities, did Saddam start counting upon his younger son Qusai, who did not prove much better. Up to 1995, the power group also included two sons in law of Saddam, the brothers Hussein and Saddam Kamel Majid, who belonged to a distinguished family in Baghdad.
But when they clashed with Udai, they took fright: they loaded wives and children on a convoy of Mercedeses and fled to Jordan. Upon arrival at Amman, they held a press conference during which they exposed the crimes of their father in law and suggested the possibility of an imminent collapse of the regime.
But, instead of heading the underground movement, after a few weeks the two decided, for reasons which remain unknown, to return to Baghdad, where a few days later they were brutally killed. Whilst the population suffers for the consequences of the sanctions (although the number of victims has been significantly exaggerated by the regime propaganda and by its foreign accomplices, such as that father Benjamin who has appeared several times on our televisions screens), Saddam and the nomenklatura continue to live in the most extravagant luxury in the various palaces they have built for themselves ever since they rose to power 23 years ago.
But the greatest part of the resources continues to be allotted to strengthening the armed forces, with special attention for the so-called mass-destruction weapons: chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons.
Dr Khidir Hamza, one of the scientists who have worked for Saddam up to 1994 (when he seeked political asylum in the West), and who in his actual capacity as an advisor of the American government continues to closely follow local developments, has disclosed in this regard extremely alarming information.
1) Unless it is stopped in time, Iraq has the technical ability to construct three nuclear devices within 2005.
2) Before being expelled, the UNO inspectors managed to neutralise part of its chemical and bacteriological arsenal, but have left largely intact the facilities whereby it was produced; therefore, thanks to clandestine purchases abroad, over the last three years Saddam has managed to restock and make up for lost time.
3) Although he had nothing to do with the Al Qaeda fundamentalists, from an ideological point of view, before September 11th Saddam was in touch with Osama Bin Laden a number of times, through his ambassador in Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, and he granted supplies of war material for his terrorist campaign. On the stock of forbidden weapons of the Iraqi dictator, there also are many other witnesses and there are no doubts as to his intention to use them, in view of what has happened both during the war against Iran and the repression of the Kurd rebellion. Although, in the light of these events, Saddam’s elimination would certainly be desirable, how this can materialise remains more than ever an open issue.
At the moment, not even Great Britain, the most loyal alley of the United States in its war against terrorism, believes the operation is possible without setting fire to the whole Middle East. Despite their mistrust for Saddam, the moderate Arab countries are definitely against, because they fear negative internal repercussions. Russia, which has given Bush the green light in Afghanistan, is not willing to do the same now that one of its old customers is involved. The European Union has always followed a pro-Arabian policy, which makes a preventive war against Iraq out of the question.
Even Turkey, which was one of the foundation stones of the 1991 coalition, is today against this intervention, in part because it derives considerable economic advantages from the present situation, and in part because it fears that a war would end up by aiding the Kurd cause. Everyone, in any case, fears that Saddam’s collapse would lead to the dismemberment of Iraq, with the birth of an independent Kurdistan in the North and a small Shiite state, satellite of southern Iran.
The United States would therefore have to act alone, as, or maybe even more than, in Vietnam thirty years ago. In November, the Pentagon leaked to the media the draft of a possible operating plan, very similar to the one adopted against the Taliban: massive support to internal oppositions, heavy bombing of military installations, of the bases of the Republican Guard and of the power buildings, whilst instigating a rebellion among a population which, according to American experts, appears to be anxious to get rid of the dictator and of his clan. The hope is that, through this triple deathblow, the regime may fall like ripe fruit from a tree. Things, however, are not that simple, and the project appears to contain a good deal of wishful thinking. Indeed, internal opposition has been wiped out by ten years of repression, the internal one is not that reliable, the regime has much sounder foundations than those of Mullah Omar, the Iraqi army has a firing power that is greatly superior to the Afghan one, and the hypothesis of a revolution at best appears problematic.
Analysts therefore believe that, in order to get to the bottom of the Saddam problem, in addition to their navy and air force, the United States would have to field a land force of at least one hundred thousand soldiers, and be prepared to suffer losses in the range of hundreds, if not thousands, of men. This is not the only problem. Without the cooperation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey, Americans would have available, as the only base for their offensive, small Kuwait, the only state that cannot flatly deny its assistance.
Even before facing the Iraqi army, the forces employed may become the target of deadly terrorist attacks. And once again, having won the war, they would have to remain in Iraq for God knows how long, to support the new government and prevent chaos, at a political and economical cost which is unlikely to be bearable.
Therefore, a new theory for neutralising Saddam without resorting to war has started to dawn. Insomuch as he appears more interested in maintaining his power than in pursuing an anti-American crusade, in order to prevent him from engaging in a real terrorist campaign, it may be sufficient to keep him constantly under pressure: insist with sanctions, impose with every possible means the resumption of inspections, insinuate into his mind that, if he does not behave, this will really be curtains for him. In any case, it will make it possible to gain time, since, if it is true that Saddam has cancer, in a little while Divine Providence will get him out of our way. (trad.Interpres-Giussano)