|
One of the subjects which has been
often approached during the recent history of bioethics relates to establishing
which moral code should represent the basis of, or at least a background
to, bioethics. Indeed, it is obvious that it is not possible to solve
some of the ethical dilemmas that the development of biomedicine causes
man’s conscience to face, unless we identify, to this end, some criteria,
standards or principles.
Indeed,
when we refer to moral dilemmas we simply wish to point out that it
is not easy to establish, here and now, what is right or wrong. But,
although rarely treated as a major theme for discussion, or as the subject
of critical reflection, the moral perspective of human actions already
exists in every free and conscious choice we make. In this regard, Positivists
were right when they stated that morality first of all consists in the
cultural environment (and therefore also in the language) with which
each man takes part in the life of the society he belongs to.
Morality
therefore becomes a problem, namely a philosophical problem, only when
we start to question the reasons which lead us to consider a certain
behaviour as right or wrong. But for the most part we are all used to
living and evaluating things in accordance with the criteria, principles
and values we have “sucked with our mother’s milk” so to speak. Whoever
wishes to give reasons of his/her actions and explain their significance
needs to refer to a range of meanings and values which he/she expects
to be shared by, or at least shareable with other people.
The
familiarity which each man has with ethical terms simply involves that,
in principle, within the moral perspective there is no estrangement
among men, because conflicts, divergences, different evaluations refer
to “what is the right thing to do” and certainly not to the concept
that, if something is right, then it has to be done.
This
remark is not meant to lessen the awareness of the existence of conflicting,
or even opposite, ethical evaluations, but only to point out the raison
d’être for philosophical reflection. Indeed, although on the one hand
it is true that we need not be philosophers in order to act morally
well, and that from this point of view philosophy appears to be “useless”,
on the other hand it is clear that it is peculiar to philosophical research
to attempt to explain and justify, ever since Aristotle’s times, what
should be regarded as good and which are the various good things that
man is called to achieve.
The
dialectic procedure of philosophy, which does not acknowledge any authority
other than the evidence achieved through argumentation and confutation
of the theses opposing the one which is being supported, discourages
those who, on the other hand, are accustomed to proceeding by accumulating
data, and would like to have at hand “undisputable” issues backed, once
and for all, by general consent.
But
in the field of philosophy, the theory of mere consensus has never been
paid much heed to, since the role of philosophy is first of all that
of being “critical”, that is a never-ending verification of the convictions
which man expresses with regards to the meaning of life and of his actions.
Whereas a careful evaluation of the history of philosophy would make
it possible to detect not only conflicts, but also deep and complex
concurrences, possibly expressed in different ways, it should be pointed
out that this history has developed in terms of discussion because it
has always maintained a certain degree of trust in man’s reason and
in his ability to find truths which last in time and guide human existence
in its fundamental aspects.
But
when philosophy is not content with being an ancilla (whether it is
ancilla theologiae or scientiarum or tecnologiae), it somehow becomes
an uncomfortable presence.
A
certain intolerance towards the participation of philosophers in the
bioethical debate, which is no longer restricted to doctors’ or jurists’
considerations, also arises from the fact that we find it difficult
to appreciate the distinctive features of philosophical research, which
appears to shift the main points of the question and postpone the time
for a choice or a decision, by relating these to a system which many
people find abstract and unnecessarily complicated.
Except
for the case in which the indications provided do not comply with the
doctor’s or the scientist’s personal convictions, and he withdraws behind
the concept that each person should decide according to one’s conscience:
and in this case moral conscience is merely regarded as a subjective
verdict, and not, like in philosophy, as the ability of a subject to
identify what is really right in that particular situation. Still, this
subjectivist shortcut is the most powerful evidence of the need for
philosophy and for its critical approach: indeed the alleged subjectivist
choice is much more influenced by convictions absorbed from the surrounding
environment than we would actually expect. But when we intend to make
a moral choice, we wish to choose not only for ourselves but, as Sartre
would put it, “on behalf of all mankind”.
This
involvement of mankind in moral choices is the issue which really requires
reflection: in an age in which reason has led to an acceleration in
discoveries and demands quick decisions, the long time taken by philosophical
reflection becomes ever more necessary, even though often misunderstood.
If we do not want to reduce the bioethical commitment to a formal procedure
directed by the customs of prevailing cultural influences, or by the
standards set by individual societies, then we really need the specific
contribution of philosophy.
Adriano
Pessina
Docente
di Filosofia Morale e Bioetica Università Cattolica di Milano
|
