|
Lucio
Rondelli has formally resigned as President of Unicredito. This marks
the conclusion to the substantial disagreement on policies and strategies
for the banking group between a President who has played a more than
decisive role in making it great and the Foundations which are its controlling
shareholders. Lucio Rondelli has always thought of, lived and worked
for the ‘historical’ Credito Italiano as a strategic point in the Italian
banking system; an organisation round which others could aggregate,
and not one to aggregate around others; the centre of a federative system
established by the autonomy left to Rolo Banca. Lucio Rondelli has always
obtained the consent of the Italian business community’s leaders to
this line, and he created the convergence with RAS; that is with an
insurance group with the strength of the German Allianz. The results
for the year 2000, the last under the Rondelli Presidency, are forecast
to be the best in the bank’s history and among the best absolutely in
the entire Italian banking system. Lucio Rondelli is a banker who has
pursued and implemented a banker’s policy. A modern banker, sensitive
to the dynamics of the market in all its components, but making no compromises
with ideas that would make the logic of power prevail over that of reason
or over the interests of the bank he administered. It was in line with
this nature of his that Rondelli addressed the role of Unicredito in
Mediobanca post-Cuccia, taking the same approach as another outstanding
banker, Cesare Geronzi, President of Banca di Roma, The plan was to
redesign the role of Mediobanca and its operations in an activity coherent
with its main shareholder banks; that is, Unicredito and Banca di Roma.
The idea appeared as in some ways as a ‘desanctification’ of Mediobanca.
In this context, the Foundations and in particular that of Verona, claimed
the decision making role due to them as shareholders in Unicredito.
In the reorganisation of Mediobanca, one seems to discern a convergence
aimed at bringing together the Foundations that control Unicredito and
Cariplo, the fundamental shareholder in Banca Intesa. That is, an “axis”
of several Foundations is being formed with the objective of an agreement
between Unicredito and Intesa to create a large banking group in which
Mediobanca would maintain a role that would be autonomous but in harmony
with the group of which it formed part. It is quite clear that there
are no points of convergence between President Rondelli’s vision and
that of the shareholder Foundations, especially in the light of the
way Banca Intesa has absorbed Comit. Lucio Rondelli could not but take
note and act in consequence. It is difficult to imagine Rondelli in
the role of retiree. It is true that he is seventy six, and equally
true that he is exceptionally dynamic, intelligent and experienced.
It is highly probable that the Italian economy will soon see him back
at the helm of some command adequate to his personality. Only the future
will tell whether the Foundations’ plan is a winner. What is certain
today is that Rondelli’s resignation is not good news for Unicredito.
On
10 October 2000, Giancarlo Giglio President of the Datamat S.p.A., commenting
with particular and obvious satisfaction on the results of the OPVS,
declared: “Despite that the institutional offer was covered nearly nine
times over and the retail offer was more than six times the maximum
price bracket, we have set the price at 23 Euros in order to express
our attention and sensitivity towards new shareholders. A listing of
23 Euros will certainly be an excellent starting point for the healthy
growth of the stock value”. As early as the first day of trading (12
October), the stock, initially placed at 23 Euros, had already recorded
a loss, closing at 20.73 Euros. The quotation first “soared” to around
20 Euros and then “crashed” in the recent month: at the end of the December,
it was listed at 13.6 Euros, translating to a 40.9% negative change
compared with the OPVS (initial) price. Datamat (like many other recently
placed stocks), discounts the market “reappraisal” of the company evaluation
by using the “time-discounting” method for revenues and future profitability.
However, this “theory” would seem to have lost its charm and the suggestion
that made it appropriate for “estimates” in some way removed from the
“present situation” since these estimates are based on future performance.
The market is returning to an evaluation of companies based on what
they are and not for what they may become in the future. Based on the
“profits” that effectively result and not speculative possibilities
of the near or distant future. Based on the dividends that they actually
distribute and not which are “likely” to result. The “ estimates “ made
by management: * on the outlook for development; * on the possible acquisitions;
* on reachable goals; * on the earnings for the years to come; * on
the dividends that could be distributed, are no longer assumed to be
“certainties” but are again being assessed for what they effectively
are: “hypotheses” subject to all the risks inherent to “hypotheses”,
thus “discounting” the independent variables with which one must compare
the dynamic management of the Company over time. From these considerations,
a company emerges that confirms the expectation for financial statements
in 2000 “essentially breaking even”, as evidenced by the current reality
of Datamat S.p.A. No revenues and consequentially, no dividends. A meagre
showing for a stock that cost more than 44,000 lire. And on the horizon,
lipservice and not much else! And following the significant resources
deriving from the OPVS, the Company is involved in a whirlwind programme
of acquisitions: many of the new subsidiaries, however, are still in
growth phases and have not yet reached an economic equilibrium. In this
framework, in early November, ABN-AMRO (Sponsor for the placement) commented
on the data from the third quarter and indicated a Target Price at around
25 Euros and announced their judgement to “buy”. On 11 November, the
stock price was 20.71 Euros; after the quarterly data and AMRO’s evaluation
came out, it “crashed”, hitting a low of 13.9 Euros. Perhaps it will
rise. However, the likelihood that it will reach 20 Euros in a reasonable
time is slim, unless certain “interventions” on the capital are made.
We should add that since the OPVS, the purchasers came out “losers”
and the sellers were the “winners” (first and foremost, Giancarlo Giglio
who sold 406,844 shares for a total value of 9,357,412 Euros). The “selling”
shareholders have brought home a truckload of money, cashing in 66,551,259
Euros: 23 Euros multiplied by 2,893,533 shares. * Coordinators of the
Global Offer and Sponsor: ABN AMRO Rothschild and UniCredit Banca Mobiliare
S.p.A.
The international stock markets have effectively zeroed out the increases
they enjoyed in the early part of 1999. Exception can be made for Milan
which managed to maintain a modest 4% increase. We are now hearing the
word “recession” uttered in the United States; - the expected recovery
in Asia (in particular in Japan) has been delayed in transpiring; -
“dangerous deterioration” in the South American markets is being shown;
- Europe is demonstrating a lower rate of growth than the expected (or
hoped for)rate. This combination of “speculation” and “reality” influence
the “moral fibre” of the population that feeds the so-called “managed
savings” investments.
In
December, mutual investment funds as a whole have undergone a downward
swing and the Italian stock market has begun to look less optimistically
at the future prospects of those companies that “in and with” managed
savings have achieved their success. A feeling of uncertainty regarding
their future permeates the corps of financial consultants, whose number
(according to CONSOB statistics, updated at 31 December) has reached
nearly 50,000: more precisely 49,856 people! It is only logical, therefore,
that the top management leading the “operators” in the sector (whose
livelihood and earnings derive from “managing” others’ portfolios) are
hastily reassuring their agents and their current and potential clientele.
And putting out the fires of this alarmism. And spreading their faith
in the recovery of the international economy, stock markets, and earnings.
The recent cut in interest rates made in the United States and the consequent
“flare up” of the American stock market were, to this end, a “remedy”
hoped for but not expected in the near future.
Ennio
Doris, President of Mediolanum, the leader in managed savings, has entered
the scene, using the prestige of his company to fully support those
who announce their “confidence” in the future and the opportunity to
take advantage of the downturn as a springboard. The Mediolanum stocks,
in fact, have suffered a further nosedive in the last quarter: falling
over 20% since September. Ennio Doris, with the charming smile with
which he has “illuminated” the aggressive advertising campaign launched
by the Company that he directs (and of which he is one of the major
shareholders), has issued the reassuring messages “Now is the time to
invest in the market” (MF (Milano Finanza) on 28 December) and “The
drop in prices ? A perfect opportunity to invest” (Corriere della Sera
on 31 December). Only perhaps he didn’t choose the right days: Mediolanum,
on 28 December was quoted at 14.235 Euros and closed on 3 January with
a further loss, settling at 12.555 Euros.
It
is important to remember that Ennio Doris has shown himself to be an
excellent organiser and to have successfully created a structure able
to best exploit the tailwind that has sustained the economy in the recent
times. Today, that same “structure” must stand up to a strong headwind.
It is probable, but not certain, that it can do just that. As far as
the stock is concerned, it is likely that it will recover, since there
is no lack of strong and qualified leadership to support it. For this
reason, too, the Mediolanum stock would seem to be a real “bargain”
to “rebuild”. (traduzione Interpres sas-Giussano)
|
