The Prospects of the First Government Dominated by the Centre-Right

The title of this investigation into our near future contains ipso facto an optimistic expectation: that this may be a stable Government that truly lasts five years and that is able to carry out, or at least has enough time to try and carry out, the programme presented to the electorate. If, as the results of the elections seem to promise, this wish will actually come true - without sudden reversals or crises out of the blue - we shall have taken another basic step forward towards becoming a normal country. An element that has contributed to this hoped-for stability has been (as a partial breakaway from tradition, and possibly by slightly forcing the reading of the Constitution) the insertion of the names of the Prime Minister candidates in the electoral symbols of the two alignments. This change will ensure that a Prime Minister different from the one people have voted for may be considered a usurper, unless of course the replacement is brought about by force majeure reasons. Another crucial remark should be made: the results of the elections have not been brought about by an epoch-making transfer of votes from one alignment to the other, but are simply the reversed results of an ability in putting together alliances, which in 1996 had rewarded Mr Prodi and in 2001 has rewarded Mr Berlusconi. In substance the division of the country into two blocs has not changed. What has happened is that we have started yielding the benefits of the majority system, which guarantees stability by converting moderate numerical majorities into considerable Parliamentary majorities. But what will change, in actual fact, in Centre-Right Italy? In foreign policy nobody is to expect great changes, because in this field what is looming up is not so much a bipartisanship (as in fact the political parties of both alignments often demand), as some sort of (almost French-style) diarchy between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic, guaranteed by the presence at La Farnesina [Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of a technical minister such as Mr Renato Ruggero. In short, the President of the Republic will be answerable to Europe for the “legitimacy” of the changing of the guard, taking into account that Europe, stimulated by its own interests and incited by certain leading left-wing figures, has often scowled at the Casa delle Libertà; in exchange for this, he has requested and obtained continuity in Italy’s policy, which is in everybody’s interest. However, within this frame of stability, there is nothing to prevent a few “variations on the theme”, mainly based on more careful consideration of our country’s interests. These may involve two major changes. The first one is an attempt to “shoot from the cushion” with the new American administration, which has powerful ideological affinities with the Casa delle Libertà, partly to counterbalance the socialist hegemony within the EU, and partly to cut out a more incisive role for Italy within Europe, where we have so far chiefly been in tow. A first instance of Italy’s new attitude has been provided by the reservations expressed by the new majority with respect to the Kyoto Protocol for the safeguard of the environment, since this is full of good intentions, but lacking in operating means. The second change could be an effort, in conjunction with the Spanish Government, to subordinate our full acceptance of the Eastward opening in compliance with the limited timing demanded by Germany to maintaining a share of structural funds for Southern Italy and an improved safeguard of our legitimate interests on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. But the concept that the Centre-Right Government may ignore the commitments related to the single currency (provided of course that the European Union does not reach an agreement for the temporary loosening of the strict parameters set to support economy) is an entirely unrealistic one. The need to meet our European engagements will in fact influence, either positively or negatively, the activity of the new Government in many fields, exactly as it would have influenced the activity of a Centre-Left Government. We can expect a positive influence as regards the assistance which Brussels will provide as we carry out two major changes which are powerfully opposed, internally, from a political and social point of view, so much so that the previous Government has never dared to go about them. The first one is the liberalisation of the labour market, for which final European directives exist, and the second one is the pension reform. But the other side of the coin, the negative aspect involved by the European commitment, is the annual setting by the Union of a ceiling to the state deficit, and the strong pressure exerted at the same time on our country, based on the Maastricht treaty, for it to finally also reduce the National Debt. These factors make it more difficult to apply the general formula the Casa delle Libertà appeal to, “fewer taxes, greater development”, which was one of the causes of its success. This is a formula that has proved effective in the United States, in Great Britain and in the other countries that have emulated it. However, in order to work, it requires time and the possibility of availing itself of a transitory phase during which government income drops before rising again, and during which the national debt therefore tends to increase. This is what happened in America during Reagan’s presidency, where an actual budget crisis took place before the extraordinary boom of the nineties, and to a smaller extent also in Spain at the beginning of the Aznar period. To avoid coming into collision with the Stability Pact, the new government will have to carefully weigh the tax reduction process, starting by focusing on measures which do not have a highly damaging effect on the national revenue but have an immediately stimulating effect, as in the case of the Tremonti law for tax reduction on reinvested earnings. Only at a later stage, when it will have succeeded in plugging the holes caused in the budget by a shamelessly electoral Financial Law and in overcoming the slowdown in which Italian economy finds itself at the moment, will it be possible to start to pilot the IRPEF rates downward and to dismantle IRAP. And the same is true of the great project relating to facility modernisation. The entire country realises that a project of this type is absolutely indispensable if we want Italy to remain competitive. So, why have we accomplished so little, building up enormous delays even for essential projects? On one side there have been meagre resources, owing to the need to come within the Maastricht parameters so as to join the EURO project at once, on the other side we have had to face the enormous problem of overcoming all the legislative, bureaucratic and procedural fetters which characterise in Italy any project for public works. To get round the problem of meagre resources it will be necessary to resort, on a large scale, to a system which in Italy is not yet very well known, but which has already yielded good results abroad: that is Project Financing. Undoubtedly, we have in Italy substantial private resources that could be directed towards the public works that, owing to their usefulness for the country, promise a dividend. To try and cast off formal trammels, we shall have to apply to a law aimed at slashing the numerous intermediate steps required today. Above all, we need to create the proper climate and be brave. The other major projects which have been discussed and which we expect to accomplish over the next five years are the following. Switching from a centralist State to a federal State. This is a project that has already been approved and set in motion (even though through different formulas) by almost all political parties. However, we shall have to be careful in avoiding a trap: the possibility that, instead of making administration more efficient and close to the citizens’ needs, federalism may multiply the layers of bureaucracy and the number of expense centres. The model we are trying to emulate is the German one. Thinking of transforming Italy into a state like Switzerland would be ridiculous, thinking of emulating the Untied States model would also be absurd. On the other hand, Italy and Germany have very similar histories: they have both become unified at a later stage, compared to the other European states, and they can both rely on strong and deep-rooted regional traditions. Therefore, there should be no danger of dismembering the national State, in the event that (based on the German example) we should empower the Regional Authorities (maybe by bringing some of them together) with regards to educational schemes and the police, and complete the devolution of the Healthcare System which has already been largely accomplished. Halving the Deputies and converting the Senate into the Chamber of Regions. In theory, this reform should go hand in hand with the federal reform, but we need to take into account the objections of Members of Parliament, who will be called to vote for the abrogation of their position. Computerising the civil service. This is a matter of resources, a matter of enterprise and a matter of getting people involved. The times are ripe, a great expert has been included in the government for this very purpose, Italians should all agree on the project. But when we have to do with the civil service it is always more easily said than done! Deregulation. This is one of the reforms that Italians are most looking forward to. Today, not even insiders know exactly how many laws exist and we all know that, once you enter the maze of Codes it is very difficult to escape from it. This is the country where everything can be sanctioned, where sentences are inflicted through decimation rather than through the criterion of impartial law enforcement. When I was at La Farnesina I attempted to unify all the precepts (which were not that numerous, in any case) regulating exportations of munitions from Italy. This involved eliminating certain clauses from the law no. 185/90, which in two years had reduced our exports from six thousand to one thousand dollars, causing the loss of a very high number of jobs and the closing down of many factories. I summoned the head of the legislative department and asked him how long it would take to draft a bill. He answered that, if I was satisfied with a Mini-Reform, three months were sufficient, whereas drafting a consolidation act would take three years. Guarantying security. This is a really visceral worry, since it is not always corroborated by statistics; however, it is a worry that no Government can ignore. And because of its intrinsic philosophy, I feel that the recipes of the new Government may prove more effective than those of the previous one, which has suffered from an indulgent attitude towards both criminality and clandestine immigration, which we have paid for in a rather impressive manner. I do not know whether the necessary tools are in place to create a new security system. But there will certainly be a resolute attempt to achieve this objective: there will be a turnaround in the current proneness to forgiveness, there will be a firm refusal of clandestine immigration and there will certainly be greater investments. Again, results will not be immediate, but the process will start right away. However, it would not be appropriate to cherish expectations of miraculous results in any direction. Not even Mrs Thatcher (who was much more powerful than an Italian Prime Minister and did not have to face a bureaucracy which, especially within the higher echelons, appears to be by and large suspicious of the new executive) managed to change Great Britain in four years. Despite all her faults (among which her inborn suspiciousness towards Europe), it is Mrs Thatcher herself who will have to be taken as a model by the new government, in that she took in hand a country that needed to be turned inside out and, by overcoming all objections, actually achieved her target. The real change will be that, for the first time in the history of the Republic, the Centre-Right will be in power with ideas that, in many sectors, are quite different from those prevailing in Italy since 1953. Of course, these are ideas that not everybody share, but hopefully the present Opposition will not try and block every single change through stonewalling or, even worse, public demonstrations, as for the pension reform in 1994 (which with hindsight many people, including leftists, would now welcome). Let us allow the electorate, once this legislature has completed its assignment (which it will hopefully be able to see out), to express its own judgement. (traduzione Interpres sas Giussano)