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The
relationship between science and experience is more complex than empiricism
is willing to admit.
To
explain something in scientific terms does not involve the ability to
always and in any case adequately express something, even though one
has experience of it.
This
difference between scientific knowledge and knowledge acquired through
experience is immediately obvious when we face subjects which are undoubtedly
familiar to us but continue to be far from solved, as a confirmation
of the fact that familiarity does not measure up to evidence and that
explanations move towards experience.
It would be sufficient to think about the experience that each one of
us has of him/herself and which ordinary language classifies as consciousness
or self-consciousness. Even though we are used to attributing consciousness
to those we consider “our likes”, whenever we try to explain the phenomenon
of consciousness we are confronted with a gap, which is almost impossible
to bridge, between the explanations provided by science, and in particular
by today’s neuroscience, and the plain and unified understanding acquired
through our own experiences. Today’s debate tends to deal with consciousness
by reproposing from a new perspective the Cartesian problem relating
to the relationship between res extensa and res cogitans, which translates
nowadays as the relationship between brain and mind. The prevailing
trends within today’s culture tend to interpret the “mind” either as
a product of the brain, or as a function of the brain, which leads to
a notion of man that acknowledges his unitariness but in fact tends
to view consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the brain. The explanations
provided by neuroscience and the use of the cybernetic model in anthropology
make it possible to objectively check, so to speak, the phenomena of
human behaviour, but pay for this objectivity by having to do without
a subjective perspective. In an interesting book published a few years
ago, with the provocative title "What is it Like to be a Bat"?,
Nagel observes that, knowing the physical effects of a sensation, indicating
the components of a visual sensation or of a sonar system is one thing,
and experiencing a certain sensation is something else again: that is,
explaining how the bat views the world is one thing, and experiencing
the bat’s vision of the world is quite a different thing.
This
example was used to discuss certain theories about the relationship
between mind and brain, on which we cannot comment here; however what
we can gather from that remark is the gap existing between scientific
explanations and “first hand” experience”. It happens to us too often
to neglect this personal approach to reality, cherishing the illusion
that a scientific explanation is sufficient to adequately picture man
and forgetting that many of the things we know about man are actually
contingent on this “first-hand” approach; this is the introspective
perception which is so criticised, and however still represents today
the necessary field within which man can express himself. Indeed, what
would be the point of discussing consciousness or self-consciousness
without taking into account experience, that is the evidence, so to
speak, which man can give of this aspect of existence?
Even
scientists would not be able to see anything in the relationship among
the synapses of a brain, if they could not use them as hypotheses to
explain what each one of us (scientists included) experiences and defines
with the word consciousness. However, the scientific explanation only
expresses one level of experience, that which is acquired as a “third
party”, that is as an observer; still, the outside observer misses the
most essential aspect of our humanity, that is subjectivity. For instance,
in phenomena such as those of love or hatred, detecting the modifications
taking place in our brain or in our physiology is one thing, but understanding
their meaning and experience is a different thing, since these aspects
can only be known when they are experienced, or when we “believe” the
first hand evidence given by somebody who describes his/her own experience,
thus also making it known to us. On the other hand, a subjective experience
can also be “objectified”, so to speak, that is presented as part of
a reflection capable of explaining what man “experiences”, “feels”,
“perceives”, and this is the task which philosophy has tried to carry
out by putting together an image of man.
The
real man, the man who thinks and suffers, the man who experiences his
own body and tries to understand and control its functions, is the man
with whom the medical practice has to deal with; by limiting the experience
of the sick to considering their illness means losing sight of the complexity
of reality. But medicine can never do without a reference philosophic
anthropology, because the root cause for the care and dedication to
man goes well beyond the plain scientific representation of the world.
The very phenomena of physical pain and of moral and psychological suffering
require a methodological awareness which is always able to integrate,
within practice, an objective perspective and a “first hand” approach.
In addition, it should be pointed out that each anthropologic perspective
has to do with ourselves and attempts to explain to us who we are, and
in this regard it questions us and interests us irrespective of the
transitory role which we may occupy, as a doctor or as a patient. And,
all things considered, the task of answering the problem relating to
our identity cannot be delegated to anybody, not even to science
(traduzione
Interpres sas-Giussano)
Adriano
Pessina
Docente
di Filosofia Morale
e
Bioetica
Università
Cattolica di Milano
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