Livio Caputo

The contradiction of the foreign policy of Clinton makes the American leadership ever more brought forward In the cold war forty years, numberless times Europe has criticised the Unites States political choices with the significant exception of general De Gaulle, who even left the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, however the dissents have always been contained by a sort of under necessity condition. Totally dependent over the United States nuclear umbrella for its own defence against the soviet expansionism, Europeans ended with falling in again or as in the case of the war of Vietnam, limiting themselves to a critical abstention. But, since the USSR does not exist anymore, and the old bipolar world has been replaced by a much more articulated system, where national interests have got the upper hand and the collective security needs mainly readiness and nimbleness in holding back the breeding-ground regional conflicts, the American leadership is ever more often brought forward. Everybody acknowledges that the USA are the sole remaining superpower, that any military action of a certain extent requires their participation, that their air-sea forces power and their world intelligence system keep on being irreplaceable and that their powerful economy remains the only driving one, operating in a moment when all the others are in crisis. Nevertheless, the choices of foreign policy of President Clinton and his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright persuade ever less. It's quite widespread the feeling that Washington does not have a global plan, that reacts against crisis instead of preventing them, and applies for the trial of strength too often instead of applying for diplomacy, a high level diplomacy. The result is that alleys find it hard to understand which are the real purposes of the United States, which means they want to employ and at which extent they aim to interests that can be acceptable by the partners. In the last year, there were at least three cases the alliance USA-Europe has shown worrying creaking: Iraq, Kosovo and China. The Iraqi events are probably the most emblematic in the situation it has rose. When Saddam Hussein invaded the Kuwait in 1990, President Bush did not find any trouble to persuade the whole West (besides almost all the Arabian world) to come out against him, and at the same time reasserted the American leadership and the requirement of a whole mobilization against whom represents a menace for the world order. When eight years later, Saddam himself has challenged once more the whole world, violating the resolution of the Security Council for the dismantle of his nuclear chemical and bacteriologic weapons, only Great Britain has followed the United States on the retaliation way and had put its air force on disposal for the bombing campaign against the Iraqi military objectives. The other Europeans have adopted or an open protest position as France, or have kept standing on the sidelines critically as Italy and Germany. But if governments have attempted to avoid, for obvious reasons an open clash against Washington in an extremely delicate situation, the Parliaments, less submitted to the Realpolitik requirements, have given themselves up to a real anti-Americanism orgy. If, on a side, these phenomena are related to the trade interests Europe has in Iraq and to a different evaluation of the menace Saddam represents, they are on the other side the result of the lack of clearness of the White House policy, criticised even by the United State press. When Clinton (by then involved into the Lewinski case) launched the “The fox in the desert “ operation, many deemed that this time America intended to carry on to the end, that is to aim to the overthrowing of Saddam and so to a definitive removal of the Iraqi bubo. Instead, after four days of bombardments - it is not known how much effective- by the air forces, operations were over for the Ramadan and resumed, less intensive, with the pretext to safeguard the areas, forbidden to flying by the UNO only in February. At the same time, Americans has intensified ostentatiously their support to the (a little evanescent) Iraqi internal oppositions, playing from the cushion with the Northern Kurds and South Shiites, trying furthermore a reproaching with the ayatollahs of Teheran in an evident anti-Iraqi projection. The fact is that the moves of Washington appear disordered, not well aimed and sometimes even contradictory; hence Europeans, fearing to be involved in a failure, wash their hands of or - as in the case of Paris- row against, even flirting with the pro-Saddam positions of Russia.The Euro-American dance we have attended concerning the Kosovo problem management is not less instructive. Here the interest of the two parties coincide: the attempt to extinguish the fuse of a conflict that for its international implications could be ever more unsettling than that of Bosnia, with the less possible direct military involvement. At first Washington tried to set apart, leaving Europeans, who have resounding failed during the previous crisis, the responsibility to preside over the negotiations between Belgrade and the Kosovo and to lead, in case of agreement, the NATO's expeditionary force, ensuring in site the attendance of the truce. But it has been the White House to insist imposing- always very dangerous in the Balkans- an exact ultimatum to Serbia and it has been the White House the same, evidently a little lacking of local history acknowledgement, to behaviour as if the agreement with the Kosovo on the basis of a simple concession of the autonomy were already acquired. So Madeleine Albright must take back the ultimatum to Serbia since they were not anymore the only “wicked”, on the other side she must have taken into account that the Kosovo, supported by the too open American preferences for their cause, aimed already without qualms to a secession from Serbia and the constitution of an independent state that Europe, mindful of the Balkan wars of the beginning of the century, does not intend to accept. Unfortunately for the Americans, to the Kosovo events it has superimposed that of Abdullah Ocalan, getting forefront the Curd matter and putting at the same time in light the contradictions of the American policy about the minorities safeguard matter. While Clinton has indubitably been much more resolute than Europeans in siding with Kosovo against Serbia, in the events regarding the PKK leader and its followers, he has taken the opposite behaviour: determined aid to Turkey for the commando operation leading to his seizure, closure to the East Anatolia Kurds autonomy requirements and corresponding tolerance toward violations of human rights committed by Ankara. The anti-American party has so had a good hand in revealing how often they are unfair. The third dossier quite embarrassing for Clinton is the Chinese one. The White House has always vacillated, in a very few coherent way, between a realistic policy, centred over the maintenance of the delicate balances in the south-east Asia and over the very huge economic and trade interests of the United States in a country featured by a billion and 200 millions inhabitants and a fast development, and another more idealistic policy based on the human rights and fundamental freedom safeguard, in a country that remains, all considered, the last real communist power in the world. Doing that, they have made a lot of mistakes and have created useless resentments in the other great countries of the region. At New Delhi, so to give an example, they have never understood why Washington closes its eyes in front of the strengthening of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, that soon will be able not only to menace Japan, but also the same west coast of the United States, while they even inflict sanctions to India when last year it carried out a very moderate series of nuclear experimentation. But it is the lack of tangible results of the Clinton's policy that arises the most critics not only in Europe but in the same American political environment, that has never tolerated the abandon of the loyal Taiwan in favour of the untrustworthy Popular Republic. These incongruity and contradictions of the American superpower that, aware of its role, trends to advise with alleys ever less and to act ever more by itself, have naturally the effect to feed the foolish ambitions of independence of Europe, that institutionally is also compelled to develop a foreign and a common security policy of its own. But till now, every country has had a different extent impact. It has incited France to launch an opened j'accuse against the hegemonism of Clinton, on the traces of the Gaullist tradition; it has encouraged the red-green Germany toward a rethinking of the whole-alignment policy with America followed by Helmut Kohl; it has stimulated a serious debate even in Great Britain about if it is more opportune to keep the traditional and relatively uncritical transatlantic collaboration or to harmonize better its own diplomacy with the other union countries ones. But, if these doubts will produce, besides so many grunts, also a greater push to the unity or they will make Europe taking the required measures to ensure Europe an effective autonomy also on the military plan, is to see.